ALDOT and bridge proponents are still NOT LISTENING

The problem with the Mobile River Bridge & Bayway Project is NOT the toll. The problem is much deeper and more complex than that. At any toll rate, even zero, the MRB&B Project represents a bad investment for Mobile & Baldwin Counties, the State of Alabama, the region and the Nation.

In August 2019, the Eastern Shore Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) voted to remove the Mobile River Bridge & Bayway Project from its Transportation Improvement Plan (TIP), effectively blocking federal funding for the project. The impetus for that vote was the product of public opposition to a proposed $3 to $6 one way toll to finance a project with a need that was never clearly established. The Facebook Block the Mobile Bayway Toll Group mobilized public opposition and made it clear to local elected figures that they were having none of this foolishness.

Now comes a news report detailing how ALDOT thinks that a "much cheaper toll" would be ok. These people at ALDOT and local proponents are still not listening.

Weeks before that fateful vote, this blog argued that the toll was never the real problem. The real problem was in the planning, engineering and design of a Taj Mahal bridge and bayway system that's not necessary and would never be economically feasible.

This project's problem isn't the toll. This project's problem is a failure to meet a basic NEPA requirement to evaluate a full range of alternatives. It won't be the tolling pain that kills the project. It will be the NEPA failure.

By now, it should be clear that nowhere in the public process of preparing the necessary NEPA documents is it stated that this project's economic benefits are equal to or greater than its costs.

The Benefit-Cost Ratio is a mathematical expression of a project's worth to taxpayers. A BCR greater than 1-to-1 means that the project will improve our economic well being. A BCR less than 1-to-1 means that the project will harm our economic well being. A toll would only make our state's agony worse.

Until this project's BCR is proven to be greater than 1.0, the statement "the cost of doing nothing is too high" is patently false.

In layman's terms, ALDOT designed and engineered a bridge and bayway system that would have been overbuilt. They failed to acknowledge that there is a level of storm surge damage risk that we are willing to accept. That level of risk is far higher than what ALDOT was asking us to pay for.

From an economics perspective, the project will suck more money from our local and regional economy than it ever could hope to pay for in more businesses, jobs and tax revenue.

ALDOT deliberately withheld information about the project during the public review period.

ALDOT also inadvertently disclosed what would have been the recommended plan had they accepted the fact that they were proposing an unnecessary behemoth of a project. They withheld information they knew we needed and accidentally disclosed information that showed their lack of candor.

Here is my full review of the Environmental Impact Statement for the project.

Here is an Economic Impact Fact Sheet showing that even with a reduced toll, the project is still a proposal for economic disaster.

The project will not go forward under the NEPA document ALDOT attempted to foist off on the public. Try it, and we'll see it aired out in federal court.

Governor Kay Ivey still doesn't understand how the "NO TOLLS" thingie works

In remarks made Wednesday at an event celebrating the distribution of oil and gas royalty money, Governor Kay Ivey tried to blame "the local folks" for her decision to kill off the Mobile River Bridge & Bayway Project.

"Until they allow that project to even be considered in their project list, we can't even ask for federal funds or spend what we thought we had. So until the local folks come together and find a way to be included, this project is dead," said Ivey.

She still doesn't understand how this all went down. That project will not ever be considered, and the "local folks" can show you a little somethin' about being included.

To recap: The state proposed to build a state-of-the art architectural wonder to add a new route across the Mobile River and Delta. It was to relieve congestion, which is bad here, but not strangling like bottlenecks in Houston, Baton Rouge and Birmingham. It was to consist of a high rise bridge over the river and a complete replacement of the existing Bayway.

The price tag was a whopping $2.1 billion--twice the previous estimate. Worse, the state also proposed to fund this monster through a $6 one-way toll. The project was hopelessly infeasible and everyone knew it.

Local residents did indeed object to "that project," and made it clear that it was unacceptable. When their early, disorganized objections were met with an attitude of cool obstinance from the Governor and ALDOT, the public joined forces via social media. State Auditor Jim Ziegler and a handful of his fellow toll fighters formed the Block the Mobile Bayway Toll Group on Facebook and invited the public to join. Within three months, the group membership had reached 50,000 members and the group's message of "NO TOLLS!" could no longer be ignored. Bumper stickers. T-shirts. Peaceful demonstrations. Coordinated messages on local talk radio and across Facebook, Twitter and Instagram. Grassroots politics in its purest form.

It's worth noting that citizens were never unanimous in opposition to a new bridge or new bridge plus Bayway modernization plan. Most understood that a new route across the river and delta would be needed sometime in the un-distant future. It was the toll plan that caused the uproar (see 'Tolling for the Mobile River Bridge is a symptom, not the problem'). The local economy was at risk of suffering permanent hardship and any Gulf Coastian with a family budget could smell it.

There were other plans that should have been considered; plans that weren't calling for a Taj Mahal structure that could have been feasible. The state never told the whole truth on why such a mega-project was the only and best solution, and this lack of willingness to consider public opinion stuck in the people's craw.

Tone deaf ALDOT tried unsuccessfully to reestablish control of the narrative with pointless press releases, strawman "fact checks" and bold statements of "No tolls? No bridge!" A contentious meeting between local elected officials and ALDOT representatives and consultants ended poorly when ALDOT Director John Cooper stormed away from the dais with the now famous smart-assed comment: "You've caught it; hope you can skin it."

They weren't budging. Governor Ivey and ALDOT were going forward with the project as proposed--tolls and all. Confident that they wouldn't be stopped, they finalized the environmental clearances and began the preliminary processes to move towards construction.

That's when the Facebook group found and adroitly used the obscure provision in an obscure federal law that required local approval of the project in both their short and long range transportation plans. That approval was first tabled by the Mobile County side of the bay and then blocked completely on the Baldwin County side a week later. No local approval meant no federal funding, which meant the project could not move forward at all.

The night of the Baldwin County vote, Governor Ivey released a statement declaring the project "dead." 

The "local folks" simply blew a whistle to stop the toll bridge. That project will stay stopped. That one is dead. What about the other alternatives, like the 50-year retrofit?

To this day, members of the Block the Mobile Bayway Toll group and the local elected officials are open to alternatives for a new route between Mobile and Baldwin County. But based on Governor Ivey's comments Wednesday, the state remains unwilling to discuss toll-free alternatives. Like the 50-year retrofit. Oh, well.

That's how this works--come up with a plan that solves the congestion problem with no tolls. The Metropolitan Planning Organizations will review it, and we'll talk. We'll talk a lot, and you'll listen. A lot. Or...

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The Four Score

Federal Highway Administration quietly files Final Notice in the Federal Register

See update below.

The Federal Highway Administration has quietly filed its Final Notice in the Federal Register, ending the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) documentation and starting a mandatory time limit on litigation related to the agency's decision to move forward with the Mobile River Bridge & Bayway Project.

The $2.1 billion plan to create a new route across the Mobile River and expand the Bayway hit a practical and financial barrier to construction earlier this month when local government officials voted nearly unanimously to remove it from their Transportation Improvement Plans (TIPs). Those votes made the plan ineligible for federal funding, effectively ending any realistic chance of building the deeply unpopular project.

From a NEPA perspective however, the project is not dead. Its status is better described as in stasis. It is a project that is approved, but according to the MAP-21 Act, cannot be built. Yet.

SUMMARY:

This notice announces actions taken by the FHWA that are final. The action relates to the proposed project to increase the capacity of Interstate Route 10 (I-10) by constructing a new six-lane bridge across the Mobile River and replacing the existing four-lane I-10 bridges across Mobile Bay with eight lanes above the 100-year storm elevation. The proposed project is located in Mobile and Baldwin Counties, Alabama. Those actions grant approvals for the project.

DATES:

By this notice, the FHWA is advising the public of final agency actions subject to 23 U.S.C. 139(l)(1). A claim seeking judicial review of the Federal agency actions on the project will be barred unless the claim is filed on or before January 27, 2020. If the Federal law that authorizes judicial review of a claim provides a time period of less than 150 days for filing such claim, then that shorter time period still applies.

So what does this mean for the project's opponents?

It means that if opponents have a cause to challenge FHWA's determination that the NEPA process for moving ahead with project has been satisfied, now is the time to make it official and begin your litigation process. File your notice, file your suit, whatever legal counsel tells you to do.

Please note the last sentence in the quoted text above. It says that if a shorter clock exists, that shorter clock applies. In keeping with FHWA and ALDOT practice with this project, they ain't saying if a shorter clock exists or when it might run out. As usual, dear peasant public person, it's on you to figure it out.

What could go wrong? The two MPO's could have a change of heart after the litigation clock runs out and put the project back in their TIPs. The state could then put it back in their STIP, and the public would have no legal recourse to stop it.

This blog has always maintained that NEPA was the project's greatest weakness.

Perhaps not coincidentally, the amount of information available on the project website's documents section at www.mobileriverbridge.com has been greatly abbreviated.

Update: A friend of the blog advises me that taking this step just covers FHWA from trouble for not completing the process. She also surmises that talks between FHWA, ALDOT and local officials could produce an alternative that satisfies the local "red line" of no tolls. This filing removes the chance that the new alternative falls afoul of NEPA procedure. Fair enough.

Could such discussions be underway? I won't speculate.

Update II: The old www.mobileriverbridge.com site's documents section is back.

Media: "What the heck's an MPO?" Block the Mobile Bayway Toll Group: "Hey y'all! Watch this!"

"We the People" are smarter than you gave them credit for, aren't they Madam Governor?

In what some observers might term an upset victory, a 55,000 strong group of unruly, unsophisticated simpletons struck a mortal blow to the $2.1 billion Mobile River Bridge & Bayway Project.  The Block the Mobile Bayway Facebook Group suited up, showed up and spoke up and local officials exercised the will of the electorate.

The group did this by uncovering an obscure provision in a 7-year old federal law.

The MPO and the TIP are the creations of the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, or MAP-21 for short. MAP-21 was the brainchild of former U.S. Representative John Mica (R-FL), who was Chairman of the House Transportation Committee. MAP-21 sailed through both houses of Congress and was signed by President Barack Obama on July 6, 2012.

MAP-21 profoundly changed how the U.S. Department of Transportation and the Federal Highway Administration works with state highway departments and--importantly in this case--gave broad new powers to local elected officials. Local mayors and council members were given almost total control over the size, scope and impact of federally funded transportation projects in their districts.  Succinctly, if the locals want a project proposed by the state and federal highway folks, they allow it and it goes into the community's TIP. The state then puts that TIP into their State TIP (STIP) and that goes to the feds.

If a project doesn't go into the TIP, it can't go in the STIP, and the state can't get federal funding for the project. Neat, huh?

No one in the print, broadcast or online media had a clue about MAP-21, MPOs or TIPs. Federal officials ostensibly knew what these acronyms meant. ALDOT certainly did, but since that bunch has a nasty habit of not volunteering information that might hurt them, they said nothing.

The grassroots group discovered it, though. The group also discovered that projects critical to the Bridge & Bayway weren't included in the TIPs yet, and that they could be excluded from the TIPs by the MPOs.  They mobilized their forces, explained the potential impacts of the obscure federal law provisions to their local elected officials and inundated them with requests for action. The officials listened to the concerns of their constituents and followed their suggestions.

The Mobile Metropolitan Planning Organization (MMPO) met first on August 21, 2019. The Eastern Shore MPO (ESMPO) met a week later on August 28. The purpose of these meetings was to approve the Transportation Improvement Plans (TIP) for Mobile and Baldwin County, which among other things included a list of projects the MPOs wished to approve so that the projects in their plan could accept federal funding. Both MPOs voted overwhelmingly to remove all projects related to the Bridge & Bayway and that was that.

When they were through, the Bridge & Bayway project was pronounced dead by Governor Kay Ivey and everyone from the ALDOT War Room to the local media joint's News Room asked, "what the heck did we just watch?"

There is a delicious bit of irony in how this all shook out. To the bitter end, ALDOT was sticking to a claim that federal law required that the existing Bayway had to be replaced. The whole time they were defending this position, local officials, the media and even your beloved IBCR Blogger was asking, "where's the federal law?" Sadly, some people were beginning to accept the inevitability of a $2.1 billion behemoth they didn't want.

It wasn't until near the very end of this process did the ALDOT "federal law!" facade begin to tremble.

Then, out of nowhere an honest-to-goodness real federal law was found, and the Block the Mobile Bayway Group used it masterfully and saw ALDOT and the Governor hoisted with their own petard. 

"Hey, y'all! Watch this!"

Boom, baby. 

ALDOT withheld critical information during public review and AFTER the Record of Decision.

Monday night's publication of the Alabama Department of Transportation's reasoning for recommending replacement of the Bayway (PDF) as part of the Mobile River Bridge & Bayway Project came AFTER the Record of Decision (ROD) was signed on August 15, 2019.

It came AFTER the ROD was announced in the Federal Register.

ALDOT claimed in its "Media Response and Project Information – Bayway Height" that:

To comply with Federal regulations, ALDOT determined replacing the Bayway above the 100-year storm surge elevation is in the best interest for the safety of traveling public and is the most cost-effective solution.

As we saw yesterday, this is certainly not the most cost-effective solution. That solution is widening and retrofitting the existing Bayway and providing for its complete replacement 40 years from now (or whenever construction is complete).

The Bayway Alternatives Analysis Matrix that was released with the Media Response fails to reflect the discounted present value of future replacement and is based on the ridiculous assumption that widening and retrofitting the Bayway will not extend its useful life.

The key takeaway is not that the August 26 documents are incorrect. It's that ALDOT didn't release them until the ROD was signed and delivered, an action which completes the NEPA process for the project.

If this information had been known prior to the publication of the Final SEIS and the ROD, members of the public, the news media and local elected officials could have done something with it.

Instead, ALDOT held a number of listening sessions and meetings with local officials. They never told those officials what the regulations really said. They never shared an alternatives analysis matrix. They never told anybody that a structure built to the 50-year standard was not only permissible, but cost-effective.

You can't use critical information you aren't told about.

Instead, Governor Kay Ivey blasted every media outlet in the state with a rambling op-ed, and called opponents' statements "misinformation."

It's not like this information wasn't asked for, either. Click (or tap) the image below:

What this silence tells me is that ALDOT had this information. ALDOT knew this information could change the course of public discussion of the project. ALDOT knew this information might then cause the agency to reevaluate alternative plans.

And ALDOT held this information until after the NEPA process was complete.

I repeatedly asked ALDOT to delay the NEPA process and re-open or extend public review and they repeatedly refused to do so. 

I leave it to my readers to speculate on the reason why.

ALDOT shreds remaining credibility, now says elevating the Bayway is... the least cost option?

ALDOT has been lying to us all along. There was never a federal requirement to elevate the Bayway to withstand the 100-year tropical storm surge with 100-year sea level rise.

ALDOT Director John Cooper told NBC 15 that federal law required elevation above the 100-year in July. He repeated the statement to Fox 10. The project manager for this boondoggle said it to WKRG.

(Extra Point: Go here to see how many different ways Cooper has tried selling this story.)

Governor Kay Ivey told every media outlet in the state that it was the truth.

ALDOT was asked repeatedly by members of the public, local elected officials and even your beloved blogger what specific federal law or regulation stated "thou shalt not build below the 100-year event." We never got a straight answer.

We now know that the requirement was a whole cloth fabrication.

Brazenly, the agency now says (PDF) that elevating the Bayway to their imaginary 100-year standard is the least cost option!

Making inaccurate statements because of a mistake or incomplete information is one thing. Making false statements knowing they are not true is lying.

How are we to believe that the cost estimates provided in the link above are accurate? They've been lying to us for months and now we can trust them?

How stupid do they think we are?

If you thought the peasants in the Block to Mobile Bayway Toll Facebook Group were revolting before this, you ain't seen nothing yet.

Even if we were to take the cost estimates at face value, the notion that they demonstrate replacement to be the least cost option is wrong because ALDOT still doesn't understand the time value of money concept.

Economics 201, y'all (click or tap the image for larger scale).

The table above comes from ALDOT's PDF, wherein the agency claim that the widened and retrofitted Bayway will have to be replaced 20 years after the upgrade because it will have reached the end of it's useful life.

The top two lines are for upgrading the structure. The bottom two are for replacement. There are calculations shown for building to the 50-year event and the 100-year event.

This new argument has more than one problem.

1. The process of widening & retrofitting the Bayway will absolutely extend the structure's useful life, making the contention that it needs to be replaced in a mere 20 years highly questionable.
2. Even so, a cost anticipated 20 years into the future must be discounted to present day dollars. At 2.5% interest and a 20-year term, the cost to replace the upgraded Bayway is $397 million, not $651 million as shown for the 50-year option. The 100-year option's discounted replacement cost is $543 million, not $890.
3. If the useful life of the Bayway is extended to 40 years by the widening & retrofit work, then the discounted replacement cost is $242 million for the 50-year option. This makes the 50-year retrofit the least cost option at $770 million total.
4. The difference in cost between Bayway widening & retrofitting today and replacing sometime in the future is... interesting. Why does it cost more to widen and retrofit today than it does to replace that same structure tomorrow? If a brand new widened & retrofitted 50-year Bayway costs only $651 million, we'll take one today in Coral Pink with the Key Lime highlights.

The most likely answer to No. 4 is that these numbers are completely bogus, just like everything else ALDOT has been telling us about this project. They're probably made up to fit the narrative they're selling today.

Tomorrow, Baldwin County's Metropolitan Planning Organization has an opportunity to tell ALDOT how they feel about being lied to.

ed note: This post is subject to revision. Please let me know about any problems at BridgeReview@ibleedcrimsonred. com. I will try to be prompt. 

Plus, there are several other items of interest in ALDOT'S new story that need to be addressed, which will be covered in a future post. 

MOBILE RIVER BRIDGE & BAYWAY PROJECT ECONOMIC IMPACT FACT SHEET

FACT: The $2.1 billion Mobile River Bridge & Bayway Project has a benefit-cost-ratio less than 1-to-1 and will consume far more economic resources than it produces. The No-Build alternative is more favorable.[1]

FACT: In 2019 dollars, the Bridge alone will have a $6.8 million annual negative impact on the Mobile maritime industry. The economic impact to other sectors (tourism, healthcare, construction, retail trade, etc) is unknown.[2]

FACT: The economic value of storm surge risk to both the existing Bayway and the proposed new Bayway is undisclosed and unknown.[3]

FACT: The Traffic & Revenue Study improperly uses arbitrary inflation rates in its forecasts and uses a lower inflation rate for cost growth and a higher inflation rate for revenue growth, producing artificially distorted net revenues.[4]

FACT: The Africatown/Plateau Community and Downtown Mobile will face higher traffic congestion costs and increased accident risk cost from drivers avoiding the MRB&B transportation tax.[5]

FACT: Mobile and Baldwin area law enforcement and judicial administrative systems face unknown burdens and unknown costs in enforcing transportation tax payments.[6]

FACT: The project includes bicycle, pedestrian and other recreational features that serve neither the stated project purpose or need and have no identified methods of paying for themselves.[7]

FACT: A new toll is a de facto tax increase. Enforced tolls and enforced taxes are treated identically by consumers and businesses in the marketplace. Consumers seek to avoid taxes where practical and/or constrain spending elsewhere. Businesses pass the full cost to consumers through price increases and accept the risk of lost sales. The cost of everything increases.

CONCLUSION: The MRB&B Project represents a bad investment for Mobile & Baldwin Counties, the State of Alabama and the Nation.

Read the full report on the project here.

---

[1] Draft Environmental Impact Statement, 2014, Table 9, indexed to 2019 dollars using CPI 2012-2019.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Supplemental Draft EIS, 2019, Appendix G.

[4] I‐10 Mobile River Bridge and Bayway – Draft Traffic & Revenue Study Report, May 2018.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Alabama Senate Bill 347.

[7] Final Environmental Impact Statement and Record of Decision, 2019.

Mobile River Bridge Plan is Fatally Flawed: Reason 19

I submitted an independent review of the Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Statement (SDEIS) to the Alabama Department of Transportation (ALDOT) on July 10, 2019. As of this writing, ALDOT has not acknowledged receipt of my report, containing 19 specific issues with the project's decision document. The SDEIS is the most important document pertaining to the project. The bridge and bayway replacement cannot go forward without it.

The document is fatally flawed.

Since ALDOT has neither publicly nor even privately acknowledged that they are aware of these 19 specific problems with their decision document, I am sharing them with you, one at a time.

Note: Comments 12-19 are all about the Traffic & Revenue Study, which is the key to how the toll structure was developed. This is Economics 205 level stuff.

Comment 19: The T&R Study is silent on risk and uncertainty, key factors in the judgment of the ability of the project to perform as expected economically and financially.

Basis: The word “uncertainty” is used only once in the T&R Study—in the preparer’s disclaimer of any warranty on the study’s projections or estimates. The word “risk” is used in a similar fashion and only once.

A reasonably thorough discussion of the probable impacts of a project’s non-performance is required under NEPA. None of the important variables subject to uncertainty and capable of increasing risk are even identified. What is the probability that future traffic flow will fall short of forecasts? The correct answer is that we are uncertain. What difference between forecast and actual traffic is enough to drive the concessionaire to insolvency? The correct answer is if we don’t know, we had better find out because we are at risk. Here, the study avoids these discussions altogether.

Without resolution, this issue could halt finalization of the SDEIS.

Read the full report here.

Mobile River Bridge Plan is Fatally Flawed: Reason 18

I submitted an independent review of the Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Statement (SDEIS) to the Alabama Department of Transportation (ALDOT) on July 10, 2019. As of this writing, ALDOT has not acknowledged receipt of my report, containing 19 specific issues with the project's decision document. The SDEIS is the most important document pertaining to the project. The bridge and bayway replacement cannot go forward without it.

The document is fatally flawed.

Since ALDOT has neither publicly nor even privately acknowledged that they are aware of these 19 specific problems with their decision document, I am sharing them with you, one at a time.

Note: Comments 12-19 are all about the Traffic & Revenue Study, which is the key to how the toll structure was developed. This is Economics 205 level stuff.

Comment 18: The 5% estimate for invalid tags is unrealistically small.

Basis: Alabama drivers are notorious for failure to register and/or keep registration current. Under current Alabama law, any individual may purchase a vehicle without simultaneously being required to purchase liability insurance. Since proof of insurance is required to register the vehicle and purchase a tag, a significant proportion of vehicles in Mobile and Baldwin counties do not have valid tags. While it is beyond the scope of this review to estimate tag and registration noncompliance, the percentage of vehicles with no tags will have a significant effect.

Also, a toll bridge creates an incentive to not register a vehicle or to simply remove tags prior to planned trips. This will affect out-of-state drivers as well, since a vehicle with no tag can originate from any state. There is nothing to prevent a driver from any state from stopping just outside the region, removing the tags, and replacing them once the trip is complete.

This study makes no effort to determine what percentage of the historical, existing or future vehicles in the market area are improperly tagged or simply unregistered. The 5% figure is taken from thin air.

Without resolution, this issue is unlikely halt finalization of the SDEIS.

Read the full report here.

Mobile River Bridge Plan is Fatally Flawed: Reason 17

I submitted an independent review of the Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Statement (SDEIS) to the Alabama Department of Transportation (ALDOT) on July 10, 2019. As of this writing, ALDOT has not acknowledged receipt of my report, containing 19 specific issues with the project's decision document. The SDEIS is the most important document pertaining to the project. The bridge and bayway replacement cannot go forward without it.

The document is fatally flawed.

Since ALDOT has neither publicly nor even privately acknowledged that they are aware of these 19 specific problems with their decision document, I am sharing them with you, one at a time.

Note: Comments 12-19 are all about the Traffic & Revenue Study, which is the key to how the toll structure was developed. This is Economics 205 level stuff.

Comment 17: Toll price elasticity of demand is treated improperly.

Basis: Chapter 10 of the study discusses drivers’ sensitivity to toll price only theoretically and uses assumptions rather than empirical data. There is extensive literature on price elasticities and studies conducted on tolled thoroughfares from around the country. Little of this information was used in this study, if any. It is inexcusable to simply make assumptions based on a review of internally produced synthetic data.

The study then comes up with the conclusion that travel demand is price inelastic. This conclusion is based on supposition rather than observation of actual consumer behavior.

Without resolution, this issue is unlikely to halt finalization of the SDEIS.

Read the full report here.

Mobile River Bridge Plan is Fatally Flawed: Reason 16

I submitted an independent review of the Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Statement (SDEIS) to the Alabama Department of Transportation (ALDOT) on July 10, 2019. As of this writing, ALDOT has not acknowledged receipt of my report, containing 19 specific issues with the project's decision document. The SDEIS is the most important document pertaining to the project. The bridge and bayway replacement cannot go forward without it.

The document is fatally flawed.

Since ALDOT has neither publicly nor even privately acknowledged that they are aware of these 19 specific problems with their decision document, I am sharing them with you, one at a time.

Note: Comments 12-19 are all about the Traffic & Revenue Study, which is the key to how the toll structure was developed. This is Economics 205 level stuff.

Comment 16: The assumptions regarding historical, existing and expected future traffic patterns and growth do not appear realistic.

Basis: Negative growth in traffic between 2005-2014 assumed to be related to increased gas prices and the 2008-09 financial crisis and recession. This assumption does not address technological growth during this period (eg, iPhone introduced in 2007) and remote work capability. Also, 2004 and 2005 were the years of Hurricanes Ivan and Katrina respectively, which temporarily altered traffic patterns due to recovery efforts (debris management, construction, temp relocations, etc).

Using the 10-year period between 2005-14 thus does not likely reflect the true underlying historical traffic growth. The T&R Study should explore a more detailed economic setting that addresses the effects of back-to-back storm years, reduced traffic flows due to technological growth and other external factors affecting traffic on the I-10 corridor between the AL/FL line and the AL/MS. Line.

Without resolution, this issue is unlikely to halt finalization of the SDEIS.

Read the full report here.

Mobile River Bridge Plan is Fatally Flawed: Reason 15

I submitted an independent review of the Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Statement (SDEIS) to the Alabama Department of Transportation (ALDOT) on July 10, 2019. As of this writing, ALDOT has not acknowledged receipt of my report, containing 19 specific issues with the project's decision document. The SDEIS is the most important document pertaining to the project. The bridge and bayway replacement cannot go forward without it.

The document is fatally flawed.

Since ALDOT has neither publicly nor even privately acknowledged that they are aware of these 19 specific problems with their decision document, I am sharing them with you, one at a time.

Note: Comments 12-19 are all about the Traffic & Revenue Study, which is the key to how the toll structure was developed. This is Economics 205 level stuff.

Comment 15: Chapters 8-11 use arbitrary and different inflation rates for both system costs and revenues. This artificially distorts the effect of inflation and produces a meaningless comparison of revenues, costs and financial feasibility.

Basis: Expected future cash flows should NEVER be expressed in inflated values. Only constant (real) dollars are meaningful because any rate of growth used to inflate the values would also be used to discount them in a present value calculation. This is a basic concept in economic and financial analysis and the fact that it was abandoned in this study is deeply troubling.

Worse, a different rate of growth is used to inflate toll revenues in Chapter 9 than either the value of time or vehicle operating cost in Chapter 8. Worse still, a different and undisclosed rate is used to inflate future operations and maintenance costs in Chapter 11.

Having at least two and as many of three different inflation rates makes any comparison of cash flows meaningless. It is especially troubling to have toll revenues with a growth rate higher than the growth rate of toll system costs. This could lead to suspicion that the analysis is rigged to favor implementing the project. This appearance must be avoided.

Without resolution, this issue could halt finalization of the SDEIS.

Read the full report here.

Mobile River Bridge Plan is Fatally Flawed: Reason 14

I submitted an independent review of the Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Statement (SDEIS) to the Alabama Department of Transportation (ALDOT) on July 10, 2019. As of this writing, ALDOT has not acknowledged receipt of my report, containing 19 specific issues with the project's decision document. The SDEIS is the most important document pertaining to the project. The bridge and bayway replacement cannot go forward without it.

The document is fatally flawed.

Since ALDOT has neither publicly nor even privately acknowledged that they are aware of these 19 specific problems with their decision document, I am sharing them with you, one at a time.

Note: Comments 12-19 are all about the Traffic & Revenue Study, which is the key to how the toll structure was developed. This is Economics 205 level stuff.

Comment 14: A tolling regime that does not account for peak demand artificially reduces potential revenue while failing to signal actual trip cost to consumers.

Basis: The proposed tolling plan does not foresee imposing a variable toll rate based on time of day, day of week or season. Imposing a higher toll on a trip taken during peak demand periods leaves a great deal of toll revenues on the table. For example, Friday afternoons between 4:00pm and 6:00pm would generate a significant increase in toll revenue, creating an opportunity to reduce tolls on non-peak travel and consequently reducing the potential impact to the local consumer budget.

Peak load pricing is a common subject in the study of consumer behavior. If a consumer knows that he will pay more for a good or service during peak times, he is likely to alter the timing of his consumption to the point where value lost from off peak consumption is roughly the same as value gained from peak consumption.

A broad array of peak and off-peak toll regimes should be considered, and the ones generating the greatest net revenue with the least local consumer budget should be highlighted, discussed and compared.

Without resolution, this issue could halt finalization of the SDEIS.

Read the full report here.

Mobile River Bridge Plan is Fatally Flawed: Reason 13

I submitted an independent review of the Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Statement (SDEIS) to the Alabama Department of Transportation (ALDOT) on July 10, 2019. As of this writing, ALDOT has not acknowledged receipt of my report, containing 19 specific issues with the project's decision document. The SDEIS is the most important document pertaining to the project. The bridge and bayway replacement cannot go forward without it.

The document is fatally flawed.

Since ALDOT has neither publicly nor even privately acknowledged that they are aware of these 19 specific problems with their decision document, I am sharing them with you, one at a time.

Note: Comments 12-19 are all about the Traffic & Revenue Study, which is the key to how the toll structure was developed. This is Economics 205 level stuff.

Comment 13: Ability to pay is not factored into the value estimates underlying the proposed toll.

Basis: Ability to pay is a driving factor in any successful transaction in a market economy. One must be both willing and able to pay for any product or service. Any analysis of willingness to pay that does not recognize the consumer’s budget constraints will always and everywhere artificially inflate the value of the subject good or service.

As an illustration, consider the homebuyer thinking of a landlocked vs a waterfront dwelling. The waterfront house is certainly more desirable than the same house located inland. But only a limited number of homebuyers can afford the additional costs of the waterfront property. The T&R Study does not account for budget constraints and thus would estimate value as if everyone can afford to live on the beach, lagoon, bay or river.

Our free market economy is full of examples where transactions do not occur even when producers have efficiently priced goods and consumers have the willingness to pay but lack the financial means to complete the purchase.

The only thing that this study does is estimate how much appreciation the window shopper has for the dress or suit just inside the clothing store. This is unrealistic, further rendering the study’s trip value estimate useless.

Without resolution, this issue could halt finalization of the SDEIS.

Mobile River Bridge Plan is Fatally Flawed: Reason 12

I submitted an independent review of the Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Statement (SDEIS) to the Alabama Department of Transportation (ALDOT) on July 10, 2019. As of this writing, ALDOT has not acknowledged receipt of my report, containing 19 specific issues with the project's decision document. The SDEIS is the most important document pertaining to the project. The bridge and bayway replacement cannot go forward without it.

The document is fatally flawed.

Since ALDOT has neither publicly nor even privately acknowledged that they are aware of these 19 specific problems with their decision document, I am sharing them with you, one at a time.

Note: Comments 12-19 are all about the Traffic & Revenue Study, which is the key to how the toll structure was developed.  This is Economics 205 level stuff.

Comment 12: Value of time/willingness to pay is improperly estimated and therefore useless.

Basis: The Traffic and Revenue Study uses a contingent valuation method (CVM) to attempt to reveal consumers’ willingness to pay to avoid congestion.  CVM studies are notoriously difficult to conduct objectively and reliably and are most often used for small-scale projects or for preliminary investigations to determine whether additional investigations are warranted.

One difficulty in conducting a CVM study is attaining a representative sample of the population the analyst intends to model. This study contains no documentation of how the sample size or sample demographics were determined. This study provides no descriptive statistics and does not provide a margin of error for the topline figures or breakdowns by demographic. Accordingly, the reader cannot tell whether the survey’s sample is representative of the population being modeled. One could suspect that the sample was selected because it was most beneficial to the analyst’s desired outcome. Such appearances must be carefully avoided.

Assuming one has a representative sample, it must be surveyed with an unbiased survey instrument that does not lead respondents in any direction (i.e., leading towards favoring or opposing a particular project or alternative). There are numerous sets of examples and guides on designing an unbiased survey instrument, including a comprehensive collection of example questions recommended by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget for use in federal projects that may come before OMB for consideration for inclusion in the President’s budget. This study does not provide copies of the survey instrument, so the public cannot determine whether its questions are biased or unbiased.

Care must be taken in survey administration to screen for strategic bidding in survey responses. Generally (but not always), strategic bidding falls into two categories: the ‘free rider” response and the “altruist” response. The free rider pretends not to value the resource or good/service in the hopes that he/she will get the benefit for free and will place zero or mere token value on it. The altruist values societal benefit more than his own satisfaction and pretends to place greater value on the resource, giving it an inflated value. It is not acceptable to simply assume that the two strategies cancel each other. There is no indication that the T&R Study recognizes the problem of strategic bidding and does not provide assurance that it has been addressed.

There is no evidence that the sample is representative, that the survey is unbiased, or that strategic bidding has been accounted for and addressed.

A travel cost method using actual and forecast travel rates along with published statistics on vehicle operating costs would transparently estimate the actual value of a trip on the existing Bayway and its alternatives. However, no method other than a CVM was contemplated for this study.

Without resolution, this issue could halt finalization of the SDEIS.

Read the full report here.

Mobile River Bridge Plan is Fatally Flawed: Reason 11

I submitted an independent review of the Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Statement (SDEIS) to the Alabama Department of Transportation (ALDOT) on July 10, 2019. As of this writing, ALDOT has not acknowledged receipt of my report, containing 19 specific issues with the project's decision document. The SDEIS is the most important document pertaining to the project. The bridge and bayway replacement cannot go forward without it.

The document is fatally flawed.

Since ALDOT has neither publicly nor even privately acknowledged that they are aware of these 19 specific problems with their decision document, I am sharing them with you, one at a time.

Comment 11: Pedestrian/bicycle facilities do not meet any stated need or purpose in Section 2.0 of the SDEIS. They add significantly to the costs with no discussion of economic benefits or of how these facilities pay for themselves.

Basis: Nowhere in the SDEIS is there a discussion of recreational feature costs or any apparent means with which to offset them through tolls for recreational use. Nor is there any discussion of what economic or financial output is produced by these features, The SDEIS merely states that it is committed to providing them but does not state why they are needed.

Without resolution, this issue is unlikely to halt finalization of the SDEIS.

Read the full report here.