Showing posts with label Thad Allen. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Thad Allen. Show all posts

Thursday, September 30, 2010

Admiral Thad Allen officially steps down as Oil Spill National Incident Commander

image Admiral Thad Allen, the man Obama tapped as the Gulf Oil Spill National Incident Commander, officially steps aside tomorrow, October 1. 

Allen was chosen as the NIC 11 days after the Deepwater Horizon rig exploded, caught fire and sank, and the Macondo well it was drilling began spewing oil into the Gulf of Mexico.  Allen  was chosen because he was the veteran of Katrina and Rita recovery operations.

Allen took a lot of heat from local and state politicians (it’s an election year, after all).

I know some people may disagree with this assessment, but overall, Admiral Thad Allen did an excellent job, given the task, the resources and the political environment he had to work in.  His (almost) daily briefings were informative.  He always sounds like he knows what he's talking about, regardless of the subject's technical difficulty.  Whether its booming, skimming and beach cleaning activities or complex engineering and physical characteristics of a runaway oil well and malfunctioning mechanical devices, Allen communicated exactly what was going on and why. 

That shows a penchant for listening to the people working for him, and making decisions based on the best information he has available.  He had no agenda and since he was already officially retired, job security was not an issue.

While Allen’s leadership was completely apolitical, the biggest challenge he faced was making decisions in an environment completely controlled by a White House for which every decision was run through the political sieve. He got things done anyway.  Maybe not always at the speed the locals liked, maybe not always choosing the path the White House wanted.  But he got stuff done.

Admiral Allen should go into retirement knowing that his was a job (mostly) well done.

Wednesday, July 14, 2010

Regime stops BP from plugging the damned hole

Stunning development, here. 

Late Tuesday night, the government abrubtly called for an all stop on the installation of the new cap, and drilling of the relief well.

In a morning press conference today, BP Vice President Kent Wells gave some details on what was behind the stoppage:



  Photo Credit: AP/Dave Martin

The testing delay was announced with little explanation late Tuesday night by Coast Guard Adm. Thad Allen, the federal oil-spill response commander.

Wells, in a morning press conference, said the "24-hour timeout" was ordered due in part to questions about whether the test would be able to determine a key issue: Whether the oil, if leaking, was coming from a shallow or a deep part of the well.

"What we want to do is avoid that oil is being put out in the shallow environment," Wells said. "There's always the potential, remote as it might be, that it could breach up to the surface."

The threat of a crater forming on the sea bed around the well head -- with oil flowing from multiple points -- would be a potentially catastrophic scenario that would make containing the oil extremely difficult.

But according to Darryl Bourgoyne, director of the petroleum research lab at Louisiana State University, leaks deep in the well may not be much of a problem--so long as it was so deep that "the fluid would stay in the subsurface, and cratering wouldn't be a risk."

The government, not a BP executive, should be explaining the stoppage.  If they have a concern with the geology of the well site or threats to the surrounding seafloor, they should identify and explain them. 

In the Times-Picayune piece from the second link, the government also stopped the drilling of the relief well, which is now only a few meters from the leaking Macondo well.  The most likely fear is that if the new cap is closed and the well is leaking below the sea floor, the final few feet of rock separating the incoming relief well and the Macondo well bore could be compromised, potentially causing a blowout on the Development Driller III rig.  If that's the case, then why not reconnect the oil capture devices--which BP and the government say are capable of collecting all of the oil coming from the well--and let the relief well drilling continue?  The relief well is the final solution, so any delay in that project results in another day on this disaster's timeline.

Another marine geologist and petroleum drilling expert, Roger Anderson, quoted in the Times-Picayune story, suggests that the stoppage is simply the result of abundance of caution:

Roger N. Anderson, a marine geologist at Columbia University, said he believes BP and government scientists are just being very cautious. They may have found something surprising around the well during the countdown Tuesday to testing the cap, but he's not worried.

"So I wouldn't panic, is the answer. They're going to be very, very deliberate about this," Anderson said.

Deliberate for about five minutes, please.  If you're worried about the well bore and causing damage to the relief well with a pressure test, then don't do the pressure test.  Connect the oil collection equipment to the new cap, pump the oil to the surface, and let the drilling of the relief wells move forward, and plug the damned hole.

Gimme some feedback in the comments.

Thursday, July 8, 2010

Guess who's calling the shots on the Deepwater Horizon response...

Exactly who in the federal government is calling the shots on the Deepwater Horizon Incident response?   Admiral Thad Allen might have let it slip yesterday during his daily media briefing, but it's useful to examine a little background, first.

As described by this official, the process is circuitous and irrational. At the Incident Command level, BP and Coast Guard appear to each have veto authority over equipment requests. Under this power-sharing arrangement – in which BP holds the purse strings – if one disagrees, then the request is denied. Parishes must then petition the Governor’s office for the equipment. If the Governor endorses the request, then BP and Coast Guard must provide the assets. This process causes massive delay resulting in a dearth of available equipment. It also calls into question the President’s assertion that “BP is operating at our direction.”


The preceding quote is from the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform report (PDF) released on July 1, 2010 and is describing the process local officials have to go through to obtain equipment.  The report basically exposes the federal government's response as a PR sham.

What the report also exposes is the fact that the "Unified Command" and Incident Commander don't have any real authority.  As the Incident Commander under the NIMS protocol, Admiral Allen should be vested with final decision-making authority.  But the governmnent is not following the NIMS protocol.  They have instead formed a "Unified Command," in which command representatives from more than one agency function as a command unit.  One of the group serves as a spokesman, but is not designated as the Incident Commander.

So what is Admiral Thad Allen?  Is he the spokesman for the Joint Command, or is he the Incident Commander?  How about none of the above?  During yesterday's media briefing, Admiral Allen was involved in the following Q&A exchange with reporters:

Q: [Jaquetta White, New Orleans Times-Picayune] I think yesterday you said you were in Houston to meet with BP officials, and I was wondering if there were any results—any outcome from that meeting you'd care to discuss (inaudible).

ADMIRAL ALLEN: We went over three things. We went over the current effort to hook up the Helix Producer to get us to the third production platform that would bring our capacity to between 50,000 and 53,000 barrels a day to the current containment cap. And then we looked at more detailed procedures on how they would replace the current containment cap with a cap that would actually be bolted on to the flange below the current riser pipe.

The time that it would take to do that, the steps that it would take, and the weather that would be required to do that, we are talking about that inside the administration right now, and those talks are continuing. I will have to get back to Washington and continue the conversations (inaudible).

OPERATOR: Ladies and gentlemen, this is the operator. We're—we'll be at a slight delay at today's conference, if everyone holds just one moment.

ADMIRALL ALLEN: This is Admiral Allen. We got cut off. I am back. Do we have the questioner still on?

Q: Yes. Can you place any kind of percentage on what the decision would be to replace the cap at this point? Would you think you're 50/50 or are you still leaning 80 percent, 90 percent toward actually coming up with the tighter cap?

ADMIRAL ALLEN: We are still reviewing the technical specifications that were provided to us by BP on not only that cap, but several other options. The procedures on how it would be done, the amount of time at which the well would be open for discharge of some amount of oil, and the weather window that it would take to do that, and that is all under review right now inside the administration, and I wouldn't want to attach a percentage right now.

NOTE: Allen was aboard the Discoverer Enterprise during the telephone conference and there were wind squalls and 6-9' seas throughout the day. So there's probably nothing to be drawn from the fact that the line went dead right after he mentioned 'the administration.' hmmm.

Admiral Allen is not in charge.  He's not even the Incident Commander.  If that were the case, and BP convinced him that the technical specifications for the new cap were solid, he could give the order to make it happen.

But decisions like this aren't being made by Incident Command, joint, unified, or otherwise.  They're being made in Washington, DC, by Barack Hussein Obama, the real Incident Commander.


Gimme some feedback in the comments.

Wednesday, June 30, 2010

Uh oh... The 2002 Thad Allen said that the 2010 Thad Allen should waive the Jones Act

From Doug Ross @ Journal, in the 2002 Spill of National Significance Exercise, Thad Allen 1.0 said that Thad Allen 3.0 should immediately get the Jones Act waived (Thad Allen 2.0 was the Katrina version, now obsolete):

USCG Admiral Thad Allen has spent a lot of time of late in front of the television cameras after the White House realized he made a much better face-man than, say, Janet Napolitano (oops -- did I say that out loud?).



 

 

Perhaps some of this time would have been better spent in front of a web browser, where he might have Googled his own 2002 recommendations from the 2002 International Oil Spill Conference (PDF).

Among the national issues identified back in the days of the evil Emperor Chimpy McBushitlerburton was this gem:

Put simply, this document summarizes the '2002 Spill of National Significance Exercise' in -- you guessed it -- the Gulf of Mexico.

A certain Vice Admiral by the name of, uhm, Thad Allen was in command of the entire region.

On page 3 of the document, a process to instantly waive The Jones Act was put in place.

Whoops.

The Times-Picayune notes that Thad Allen 3.0 officially retired from the United States Coast Guard today, but he will stay on as the Incident Commander. All in all, I think Thad Allen 2.0 was much better.  Despite the fact that he's a Coastie and that the Katrina recovery was a land based operation, he seemed to remember things better.

NB: Doug Ross @ Journal was the first blog to link to the Deepwater Incident Timeline and has always been one of the best and consistently good right-handed source of news and information.  The blog is included in the Reading Room in the side bar, too.  Make sure it's part of your daily diet.

Gimme some feedback in the comments.

Friday, June 18, 2010

Well Bore Condition Update, kinda

On Monday, I posted an item on the integrity of the Macondo well that's currently spewing as much as 60,000 barrels of oil daily into the Gulf.  Some self-described experts in oil & gas drilling and production have expressed concern that the structural integrity of the well itself has been compromised and that the reason why the top kill procedure failed was because mud was escaping through cracks or holes in the casing of the well.  They point to the enormous amount of drilling mud used in the process as evidence that oil is escaping the well.  In yesterday's operations briefing, US Coast Guard Admiral Allen was asked about this, and here is the exchange:

[Brian Hartman, ABC News] Q: Yes, hi. Thanks, Admiral. Do you believe the well pipes themselves are broken or leaking at all? And do you have any concerns about the integrity of the blow out preventer, the well borer [sic], the sea floor that’s holding up the blow out preventer? Thanks.

ADMIRAL ALLEN: That’s a terrific question. Let me kind of take it in sequence. We have some idea of the condition of the blow out preventer and lower marine riser package. In combination, they call that the stack that sits above the well head itself. We know from some sonic testing that was done based on radiography equipment from the Department of Energy we have a partial closer of some of those rams but not a complete closer. And that was a problem for the top kill operation because we could not get enough pressure on top of the blow out preventer to force all of the mud down into the well bore to allow us to top kill it, if you will.

So we know that the, that there is, there is, and we also know that there is product rising up through the blow out preventer through the, where we cut the lower marine riser pipe. We’re not going to know the exact condition of that blow out preventer until we’ve capped the well, can remove the blow out preventer and bring it to the surface.

I’ve said on several occasions, I consider that blow out preventer almost the equivalent of this incident of the black box we would be seeking to find after an aviation accident because it can reveal a lot of information related to what happened at the time of the event. And the blow out preventer was key to that.

As you move below that and you go down into the well bore, I think that one thing that nobody knows is the condition of the well bore from below the blow out preventer down to the actual oil field itself. And we don’t know, we don’t know if the well bore has been compromised or not. One of the reasons we did not continue with top kill at higher pressures, there was a concern that if we increased the pressure too hard it might do damage to the casings and the well bore. What we didn’t want was open communication of any oil from the reservoir outside the well bore that might get into the formation and work its way to the sub sea floor and then result in uncontrolled discharge at that point. That has not happened and that’s the reason they’re taking such precautions and did not proceed any further with the top kill.

What we are doing is going down the very bottom of the well bore for this intercept and hopefully at that point they will start pumping mud in. And mud will first go up all the way and fill the well bore and then it will be forced down over the oil into the reservoir and then put enough weight of the mud to hold the oil in the reservoir. And then allow them to put a cement plug in after that.

So what I would tell you is we don’t know exactly the condition of the well bore. And that’s one of the unknowns that we’re managing around in terms of risks. And that’s the reason we didn’t go, didn’t go to excessive pressures on the top kill and decided that we’d deal with containment and then go for the final relief well.

Three things stand out here:  First, Allen says sonic and radiographic tests indicate that when the blowout preventer was engaged, the rams (hardware that mechanically crush and shut off the well pipe) were able to partially close the well, but not enough to prevent a massive flow of crude.  And secondly, Allen believes it was this partial blockage of the well that doomed the top kill procedure.

But thirdly, and most importantly of all, the actual condition of the well bore itself is not known, and probably won't ever be known, unless the worst case scenario--as described in the item I posted about Monday--actually plays out.   If the relief well is successful in stopping the flow, the well will be filled with mud and capped with cement, permanently sealing it forever and ever, Amen.  But if the relief well fails to stop the flow, the reason would almost certainly be a badly compromised well bore that lets mud escape the well.  Escaping mud would mean engineers on the surface are not creating enough pressure to contain the oil flow.

To make a long, sleeper of a post shorter, Allen's comments are somewhat encouraging, but since almost nothing has gone right in this slow motion disaster, there's still not a lot of confidence floating around out there.

Gimme some feedback in the comments.

Monday, June 7, 2010

The abysmal oil recovery effort


NOTE: Click the image for the full size version
The chart above shows that, to date, the effort to recover some of the lost oil from the Deepwater Horizon well has not been as effective as Gulf Coast residents would have hoped.  The Deepwater Horizon rig, owned by Transocean and leased by British Petroleum, suffered a catastrophic blowout on April 20, 2010.  The ensuing explosion and fire claimed 11 lives, and the vessel sunk two days later.  As she went down, the riser pipe attached to the well was damaged, allowing oil to spew nearly uncontrolled one mile below the surface.  On April 24, the US Coast Guard announced that it had discovered the leak, but, believing that the leak was not as significant as it would turn out to be, did not activate a plan in place since 1994 to immediately contain and burn off oil as it reached the surface.

Several days of bad weather dispersed the oil, and the the size of the spill grew beyond the capability to trap and burn it.  This caused the cleanup strategy to change from one of collect-and-burn to collect-and-treat.  The results have been disappointing.

The dark brown line shows the cumulative release of oil from the well since the day the leak was discovered.  For this series, I've chosen the mid-point of the government's range estimate of 500,000 to 1 million gallons per day.  The actual amount of oil released could be anywhere from around 23 million to 46 million, and officials have said that the flow rate has varied on an almost daily basis.  So, the mid-point of the range seems reasonable.

The red line shows the amount of oily water recovered over time by skimming, booming and other collection methods at sea.  Officials have said that the oil-and-water mixture contains about 80% water and about 20% oil (on average).  So, the blue line represents the actual amount of crude oil recovered from the Gulf waters.

To date, somewhere in the neighborhood of 35 million gallons of hydrocarbons have been spilled into the Gulf.  Some of that material is also natural gas, and there is no way of ascertaining the proportion of gas to oil.  So the actual figure could be somewhat less, or somewhat more, depending on how much material is being ejected and what the actual hydrocarbon mix is.  But less than half of that amount, or about 15 million gallons, has been collected in the diluted oil-water mix.  And, since that mixture only represents about 20% oil, somewhere in the neighborhood of 3.0 million gallons of actual crude have been recovered, leaving more than 30 million gallons to foul marshes, wash up on beaches, destroy wildlife habitat and kill untold numbers of wildlife.

Both BP and the federal government bear some responsibility for the failed cleanup and containment effort.  BP bears some of the blame because mobilizing equipment in a large enough scale to perform a robust collection effort is expensive.  They wouldn't volunteer the option if they didn't think they had other, less expensive options.  But the federal government shoulders the blame, as well.

For starters, reports issued in the aftermath of the accident showed that there was a culture of substance abuse and promiscuity between regulators with Minerals Management Service and oil company officials.  Reports also documented lax inspection and safety controls for years, but particularly in the weeks leading up to the disaster.

Secondly, after the incident, the government didn't begin to fully mobilize resources under the Oil Pollution Act until April 29, nine full days after the incident and five full days after the spill was discovered.  President Obama did not name an Incident Commander until May 1, eleven days after the incident and a full week after the spill was detected.  For federal officials to claim that they've been on the job "since day one" is a laughable farce.

Furthermore, the 1994 in-situ burn plan called for the staging of specialized fire boom in the area so that the plan could be implemented without delay.  However, neither the Coast Guard, nor BP, nor Minerals Management Service had even one linear foot of the material on hand. Indeed, in order to conduct the alleged "test burn" on April 28, the Coast Guard had to order the boom material from a supplier in Illinois!

And lastly, under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, the United States government has the authority to direct the "responsible party" to take whatever action the government deems necessary in order to minimize damage and protect property.  Knowing as soon as April 24 that the Deepwater Horizon incident could morph into an unprecented environmental disaster, the government essentially allowed BP to tell them what the plan was.  No one seemed to have a clue; no one seemed to be in charge.

Extra Point: What else could Obama and his regime have done to contain and cleanup this spill?  Hmmm...

America watched and waited through the failures of the sequential solutions: from Top Hat to Top Kill. What made it all the more frustrating is that a few enterprising media reports mainly outside the media mainstream told us President Obama apparently had options that could have -- and probably should have -- been ordered while we waited for the leak to be plugged.

Especially the supertanker vacuuming solution.

We learned of it from the web sites of Esquire Magazine and America Online. Esquire was the first to tell us about a 1993 effort in which Saudi Arabia used empty oil tankers to siphon away a huge oil spill at sea. Saudi Aramco, the huge oil company, reportedly kept the leak and the solution secret so the world wouldn't focus on the fact that perilous oil leaks can happen.

Esquire and aol.com interviewed a Saudi Aramco engineer at the time, Nick Pozzi, who detailed what had occurred: a flotilla of empty tankers pumped the vast oil-and-water slick into their cargo holds, then sailed to ports where the oil was removed and the water was returned to the sea.

Former Shell Oil Company president John Hofmeister also told reporters from both organizations that the tanker-vacuuming plan had worked -- and urged that it be tried in the Gulf of Mexico. He repeated his recommendation on NBC's Today Show -- so it got into the media mainstream, even though no tankers were commandeered and sent into the Gulf.