ALDOT shreds remaining credibility, now says elevating the Bayway is... the least cost option?

ALDOT has been lying to us all along. There was never a federal requirement to elevate the Bayway to withstand the 100-year tropical storm surge with 100-year sea level rise.

ALDOT Director John Cooper told NBC 15 that federal law required elevation above the 100-year in July. He repeated the statement to Fox 10. The project manager for this boondoggle said it to WKRG.

(Extra Point: Go here to see how many different ways Cooper has tried selling this story.)

Governor Kay Ivey told every media outlet in the state that it was the truth.

ALDOT was asked repeatedly by members of the public, local elected officials and even your beloved blogger what specific federal law or regulation stated "thou shalt not build below the 100-year event." We never got a straight answer.

We now know that the requirement was a whole cloth fabrication.

Brazenly, the agency now says (PDF) that elevating the Bayway to their imaginary 100-year standard is the least cost option!

Making inaccurate statements because of a mistake or incomplete information is one thing. Making false statements knowing they are not true is lying.

How are we to believe that the cost estimates provided in the link above are accurate? They've been lying to us for months and now we can trust them?

How stupid do they think we are?

If you thought the peasants in the Block to Mobile Bayway Toll Facebook Group were revolting before this, you ain't seen nothing yet.

Even if we were to take the cost estimates at face value, the notion that they demonstrate replacement to be the least cost option is wrong because ALDOT still doesn't understand the time value of money concept.

Economics 201, y'all (click or tap the image for larger scale).

The table above comes from ALDOT's PDF, wherein the agency claim that the widened and retrofitted Bayway will have to be replaced 20 years after the upgrade because it will have reached the end of it's useful life.

The top two lines are for upgrading the structure. The bottom two are for replacement. There are calculations shown for building to the 50-year event and the 100-year event.

This new argument has more than one problem.

1. The process of widening & retrofitting the Bayway will absolutely extend the structure's useful life, making the contention that it needs to be replaced in a mere 20 years highly questionable.
2. Even so, a cost anticipated 20 years into the future must be discounted to present day dollars. At 2.5% interest and a 20-year term, the cost to replace the upgraded Bayway is $397 million, not $651 million as shown for the 50-year option. The 100-year option's discounted replacement cost is $543 million, not $890.
3. If the useful life of the Bayway is extended to 40 years by the widening & retrofit work, then the discounted replacement cost is $242 million for the 50-year option. This makes the 50-year retrofit the least cost option at $770 million total.
4. The difference in cost between Bayway widening & retrofitting today and replacing sometime in the future is... interesting. Why does it cost more to widen and retrofit today than it does to replace that same structure tomorrow? If a brand new widened & retrofitted 50-year Bayway costs only $651 million, we'll take one today in Coral Pink with the Key Lime highlights.

The most likely answer to No. 4 is that these numbers are completely bogus, just like everything else ALDOT has been telling us about this project. They're probably made up to fit the narrative they're selling today.

Tomorrow, Baldwin County's Metropolitan Planning Organization has an opportunity to tell ALDOT how they feel about being lied to.

ed note: This post is subject to revision. Please let me know about any problems at BridgeReview@ibleedcrimsonred. com. I will try to be prompt. 

Plus, there are several other items of interest in ALDOT'S new story that need to be addressed, which will be covered in a future post. 

Bridge Economics in Alabama

There are three things certain in life: Death, taxes and the determination of people to avoid both.

Yes, this is going to be a snarky post with a little good ol' smart-assery. Hey... this stuff needs to be said and I have the un-buffered medium with which to say it.

Remember: I am not opposed to tolling as a concept for financing projects with the demonstrated economic benefits needed to support it. I am opposed to projects that do not have the economic benefits that the toll seeks to monetize. Ramming infeasible projects through just because you can is a recipe for economic disaster. Bad tax policy has a bad habit of making bad things happen. Duh.

Tolling defenders claim that the toll is not a tax--you can simply use another route to make the trip. This makes about as much sense as saying sales taxes aren't taxes because you can simply choose not to eat. Or not to wear clothes. Or not to use deodorant. Or not take your anti-psychotic medication. You can choose to be hungry, naked, smelly and crazy and go tax free, right? Your choice.

Come on, folks. If the government makes you pay for the privilege of doing something, it's a tax.

From an economics perspective, a tax and a toll evoke the same response in how businesses and consumers behave in the marketplace. For consumers, the cost is a new item in their budget constraint. To the extent feasible the consumer will avoid paying it and will forego buying something else to pay what cannot be avoided. For businesses, the full tax burden will be added to the cost of the goods sold and the owners will absorb the risk of reduced sales as a result.

A toll and a tax are interchangeable in a model of any economy burdened by either.

So, henceforth this space will use the term "tax" when referring to the cost burden of this project. When you correct the terminology you change the narrative.

"Toll" is a four-letter word.

Even famous people avoid taxes. We're not famous here, but we have our ways.

Under current Alabama law, anyone aged 19 and over can buy a car without being required to simultaneously register the vehicle with the state. This is because Alabama law requires car owners to provide proof of liability insurance when registering their vehicle. Not surprisingly, cars are cheap in Alabama and they're easy to obtain. Look around -- $99 sign and drive (SAD) car dealerships are thriving from one end of the state to another. They don't care about your credit and they might not even check to make sure your driver's license is valid.

Those cars will become very popular if the Mobile River Bridge & Bayway project is built as a taxed route. No tag means no tax.

Alabama drivers are also notorious for failing to renew their vehicle registration, and part of that is because they have also failed to renew their liability insurance. For many, paying the first period's insurance premium and defaulting on the plan is part of the SAD game. But the state still has a name and address for that tag, expired or not. That tag promptly disappears.

This will also be a popular choice among commuters in Mobile and Baldwin Counties, especially among lower income folks. These are the people for whom a new $90 monthly tax has crowded the budget constraint.  Do they renew registration and insurance? Do they look for work in a place with no transportation tax? Do they take a look-see at what others are doing to avoid the tax?

We can also reasonably expect the emergence of a black market dealing in fake or stolen license tags and stolen or hacked electronic transponders. Craigslist and similar sites will surely have any of these on offer.

Tough choices will be made by consumers and businesses and none of them will be beneficial to the revenues of the tax collector.

The ALDOT/FHWA team has decreed that the number of invalid tags using their project will amount to about 5%, and that average weekday traffic on the 2030 established and taxed project will be about 70,000 vehicles. Doing some math gives us approximately 3,500 tax violators per weekday.

If we conservatively assume 48 4.5 day work weeks, we could see 756,000 accused tax cheats every year.

Goat Hill has a plan for all these tax cheats. Alabama Senate Bill 347 flew through the 2019 legislative session, giving the state the power to assess administrative fees on unpaid tax violators; to non-renew vehicle registration of vehicles for failure to pay a tax violation and assessed administrative fees; and to further provide reciprocal agreements with other states or jurisdictions that have also pursued the madness of directly taxing drivers.

What percentage of the 756,000 tax cheats will bite the bullet and pay up? Half, maybe?

That leaves the other half as unrepentant tax cheats in the eyes of the pointy heads in Monkeytown. They are coming after you, you rebellious Gulf Coastians.

This is going to be our administrative and judicial nightmare:

• There won't be enough local yokels or state troopers on the road to pull over and either ticket or tow the tax dodgers. 
• There won't be enough room in the impound lots for tax dodging vehicles to be held pending resolution. Towing companies will feast on the carnage.
• Traffic court dockets will be jam packed with transportation tax dodgers. Our municipal and district court systems will have much less docket space for the real public safety threats like DUIs, reckless drivers, scene leavers and drug traffickers. Real bad guys will get away.
• What will be done with the people who are on their third or fourth tax cheat citation? Jail them?
• Vehicle registrations will plummet while $99 SAD auto sales will be steady or climbing.
• There will be thousands more unregistered and uninsured vehicles on our roadways every year. This is a serious threat to the personal and economic well-being of every safe driver on the road.
• People will inevitably lose their cars and will also lose their jobs. Another $99 SAD?
• Traffic on the tax-free route will skyrocket and traffic on the taxed route will drop. 
• The Africatown Community will be swamped with tax-avoiding but otherwise decent and courteous drivers on the tax free route.
• The taxed route operator's revenues will suffer, leading to an inevitable increase in the tax rate. The increased tax rate will then drive even more consumers to either constrain their other spending or (more likely) join the growing hordes of tax cheats.
• The economic output of Mobile and Baldwin Counties will drop. Home prices will fall. Sales tax collections will contract.
• The Alabama Gulf Coast will be less competitive in recruiting new business. Who wants to locate in an area with depressed personal income, slumping housing prices and higher-than-average unemployment?

This has a very good chance to be the economic picture of the Alabama Gulf Coast in about 10 years, if the MRB&B project is built as planned. 

It doesn't have to be this way. If the ALDOT and FHWA team go back to the drawing board, they can develop an economically feasible plan.  That plan would likely follow the lead of the 2014 EIS, which never recommended taxing the plan's users. That plan would also seriously consider the economic effects of hurricane and storm damage risk. Don't hide behind a leeway-laden standards recommendation. Don't fearfully try to design away 100% of the risk posed by an improbable storm event occurring with an unlikely sea level rise. Instead, compute the expected annual risk of a wide array of alternatives and seek the plan that best balances cost with risk reduction benefits.

The only other alternative is the no-build alternative. The people of the Alabama Gulf Coast are used to storms and hurricanes. We're used to the occasional weekday traffic jams on the Bayway. We know better than to try making an optional Bayway trip on check-in days during the summer tourist season. 

We're ok with it as is.

Mobile River Bridge Plan is Fatally Flawed: Reason 19

I submitted an independent review of the Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Statement (SDEIS) to the Alabama Department of Transportation (ALDOT) on July 10, 2019. As of this writing, ALDOT has not acknowledged receipt of my report, containing 19 specific issues with the project's decision document. The SDEIS is the most important document pertaining to the project. The bridge and bayway replacement cannot go forward without it.

The document is fatally flawed.

Since ALDOT has neither publicly nor even privately acknowledged that they are aware of these 19 specific problems with their decision document, I am sharing them with you, one at a time.

Note: Comments 12-19 are all about the Traffic & Revenue Study, which is the key to how the toll structure was developed. This is Economics 205 level stuff.

Comment 19: The T&R Study is silent on risk and uncertainty, key factors in the judgment of the ability of the project to perform as expected economically and financially.

Basis: The word “uncertainty” is used only once in the T&R Study—in the preparer’s disclaimer of any warranty on the study’s projections or estimates. The word “risk” is used in a similar fashion and only once.

A reasonably thorough discussion of the probable impacts of a project’s non-performance is required under NEPA. None of the important variables subject to uncertainty and capable of increasing risk are even identified. What is the probability that future traffic flow will fall short of forecasts? The correct answer is that we are uncertain. What difference between forecast and actual traffic is enough to drive the concessionaire to insolvency? The correct answer is if we don’t know, we had better find out because we are at risk. Here, the study avoids these discussions altogether.

Without resolution, this issue could halt finalization of the SDEIS.

Read the full report here.

Mobile River Bridge Plan is Fatally Flawed: Reason 18

I submitted an independent review of the Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Statement (SDEIS) to the Alabama Department of Transportation (ALDOT) on July 10, 2019. As of this writing, ALDOT has not acknowledged receipt of my report, containing 19 specific issues with the project's decision document. The SDEIS is the most important document pertaining to the project. The bridge and bayway replacement cannot go forward without it.

The document is fatally flawed.

Since ALDOT has neither publicly nor even privately acknowledged that they are aware of these 19 specific problems with their decision document, I am sharing them with you, one at a time.

Note: Comments 12-19 are all about the Traffic & Revenue Study, which is the key to how the toll structure was developed. This is Economics 205 level stuff.

Comment 18: The 5% estimate for invalid tags is unrealistically small.

Basis: Alabama drivers are notorious for failure to register and/or keep registration current. Under current Alabama law, any individual may purchase a vehicle without simultaneously being required to purchase liability insurance. Since proof of insurance is required to register the vehicle and purchase a tag, a significant proportion of vehicles in Mobile and Baldwin counties do not have valid tags. While it is beyond the scope of this review to estimate tag and registration noncompliance, the percentage of vehicles with no tags will have a significant effect.

Also, a toll bridge creates an incentive to not register a vehicle or to simply remove tags prior to planned trips. This will affect out-of-state drivers as well, since a vehicle with no tag can originate from any state. There is nothing to prevent a driver from any state from stopping just outside the region, removing the tags, and replacing them once the trip is complete.

This study makes no effort to determine what percentage of the historical, existing or future vehicles in the market area are improperly tagged or simply unregistered. The 5% figure is taken from thin air.

Without resolution, this issue is unlikely halt finalization of the SDEIS.

Read the full report here.

Mobile River Bridge Plan is Fatally Flawed: Reason 17

I submitted an independent review of the Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Statement (SDEIS) to the Alabama Department of Transportation (ALDOT) on July 10, 2019. As of this writing, ALDOT has not acknowledged receipt of my report, containing 19 specific issues with the project's decision document. The SDEIS is the most important document pertaining to the project. The bridge and bayway replacement cannot go forward without it.

The document is fatally flawed.

Since ALDOT has neither publicly nor even privately acknowledged that they are aware of these 19 specific problems with their decision document, I am sharing them with you, one at a time.

Note: Comments 12-19 are all about the Traffic & Revenue Study, which is the key to how the toll structure was developed. This is Economics 205 level stuff.

Comment 17: Toll price elasticity of demand is treated improperly.

Basis: Chapter 10 of the study discusses drivers’ sensitivity to toll price only theoretically and uses assumptions rather than empirical data. There is extensive literature on price elasticities and studies conducted on tolled thoroughfares from around the country. Little of this information was used in this study, if any. It is inexcusable to simply make assumptions based on a review of internally produced synthetic data.

The study then comes up with the conclusion that travel demand is price inelastic. This conclusion is based on supposition rather than observation of actual consumer behavior.

Without resolution, this issue is unlikely to halt finalization of the SDEIS.

Read the full report here.

Mobile River Bridge Plan is Fatally Flawed: Reason 16

I submitted an independent review of the Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Statement (SDEIS) to the Alabama Department of Transportation (ALDOT) on July 10, 2019. As of this writing, ALDOT has not acknowledged receipt of my report, containing 19 specific issues with the project's decision document. The SDEIS is the most important document pertaining to the project. The bridge and bayway replacement cannot go forward without it.

The document is fatally flawed.

Since ALDOT has neither publicly nor even privately acknowledged that they are aware of these 19 specific problems with their decision document, I am sharing them with you, one at a time.

Note: Comments 12-19 are all about the Traffic & Revenue Study, which is the key to how the toll structure was developed. This is Economics 205 level stuff.

Comment 16: The assumptions regarding historical, existing and expected future traffic patterns and growth do not appear realistic.

Basis: Negative growth in traffic between 2005-2014 assumed to be related to increased gas prices and the 2008-09 financial crisis and recession. This assumption does not address technological growth during this period (eg, iPhone introduced in 2007) and remote work capability. Also, 2004 and 2005 were the years of Hurricanes Ivan and Katrina respectively, which temporarily altered traffic patterns due to recovery efforts (debris management, construction, temp relocations, etc).

Using the 10-year period between 2005-14 thus does not likely reflect the true underlying historical traffic growth. The T&R Study should explore a more detailed economic setting that addresses the effects of back-to-back storm years, reduced traffic flows due to technological growth and other external factors affecting traffic on the I-10 corridor between the AL/FL line and the AL/MS. Line.

Without resolution, this issue is unlikely to halt finalization of the SDEIS.

Read the full report here.

Mobile River Bridge Plan is Fatally Flawed: Reason 15

I submitted an independent review of the Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Statement (SDEIS) to the Alabama Department of Transportation (ALDOT) on July 10, 2019. As of this writing, ALDOT has not acknowledged receipt of my report, containing 19 specific issues with the project's decision document. The SDEIS is the most important document pertaining to the project. The bridge and bayway replacement cannot go forward without it.

The document is fatally flawed.

Since ALDOT has neither publicly nor even privately acknowledged that they are aware of these 19 specific problems with their decision document, I am sharing them with you, one at a time.

Note: Comments 12-19 are all about the Traffic & Revenue Study, which is the key to how the toll structure was developed. This is Economics 205 level stuff.

Comment 15: Chapters 8-11 use arbitrary and different inflation rates for both system costs and revenues. This artificially distorts the effect of inflation and produces a meaningless comparison of revenues, costs and financial feasibility.

Basis: Expected future cash flows should NEVER be expressed in inflated values. Only constant (real) dollars are meaningful because any rate of growth used to inflate the values would also be used to discount them in a present value calculation. This is a basic concept in economic and financial analysis and the fact that it was abandoned in this study is deeply troubling.

Worse, a different rate of growth is used to inflate toll revenues in Chapter 9 than either the value of time or vehicle operating cost in Chapter 8. Worse still, a different and undisclosed rate is used to inflate future operations and maintenance costs in Chapter 11.

Having at least two and as many of three different inflation rates makes any comparison of cash flows meaningless. It is especially troubling to have toll revenues with a growth rate higher than the growth rate of toll system costs. This could lead to suspicion that the analysis is rigged to favor implementing the project. This appearance must be avoided.

Without resolution, this issue could halt finalization of the SDEIS.

Read the full report here.

Mobile River Bridge Plan is Fatally Flawed: Reason 14

I submitted an independent review of the Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Statement (SDEIS) to the Alabama Department of Transportation (ALDOT) on July 10, 2019. As of this writing, ALDOT has not acknowledged receipt of my report, containing 19 specific issues with the project's decision document. The SDEIS is the most important document pertaining to the project. The bridge and bayway replacement cannot go forward without it.

The document is fatally flawed.

Since ALDOT has neither publicly nor even privately acknowledged that they are aware of these 19 specific problems with their decision document, I am sharing them with you, one at a time.

Note: Comments 12-19 are all about the Traffic & Revenue Study, which is the key to how the toll structure was developed. This is Economics 205 level stuff.

Comment 14: A tolling regime that does not account for peak demand artificially reduces potential revenue while failing to signal actual trip cost to consumers.

Basis: The proposed tolling plan does not foresee imposing a variable toll rate based on time of day, day of week or season. Imposing a higher toll on a trip taken during peak demand periods leaves a great deal of toll revenues on the table. For example, Friday afternoons between 4:00pm and 6:00pm would generate a significant increase in toll revenue, creating an opportunity to reduce tolls on non-peak travel and consequently reducing the potential impact to the local consumer budget.

Peak load pricing is a common subject in the study of consumer behavior. If a consumer knows that he will pay more for a good or service during peak times, he is likely to alter the timing of his consumption to the point where value lost from off peak consumption is roughly the same as value gained from peak consumption.

A broad array of peak and off-peak toll regimes should be considered, and the ones generating the greatest net revenue with the least local consumer budget should be highlighted, discussed and compared.

Without resolution, this issue could halt finalization of the SDEIS.

Read the full report here.

Mobile River Bridge Plan is Fatally Flawed: Reason 13

I submitted an independent review of the Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Statement (SDEIS) to the Alabama Department of Transportation (ALDOT) on July 10, 2019. As of this writing, ALDOT has not acknowledged receipt of my report, containing 19 specific issues with the project's decision document. The SDEIS is the most important document pertaining to the project. The bridge and bayway replacement cannot go forward without it.

The document is fatally flawed.

Since ALDOT has neither publicly nor even privately acknowledged that they are aware of these 19 specific problems with their decision document, I am sharing them with you, one at a time.

Note: Comments 12-19 are all about the Traffic & Revenue Study, which is the key to how the toll structure was developed. This is Economics 205 level stuff.

Comment 13: Ability to pay is not factored into the value estimates underlying the proposed toll.

Basis: Ability to pay is a driving factor in any successful transaction in a market economy. One must be both willing and able to pay for any product or service. Any analysis of willingness to pay that does not recognize the consumer’s budget constraints will always and everywhere artificially inflate the value of the subject good or service.

As an illustration, consider the homebuyer thinking of a landlocked vs a waterfront dwelling. The waterfront house is certainly more desirable than the same house located inland. But only a limited number of homebuyers can afford the additional costs of the waterfront property. The T&R Study does not account for budget constraints and thus would estimate value as if everyone can afford to live on the beach, lagoon, bay or river.

Our free market economy is full of examples where transactions do not occur even when producers have efficiently priced goods and consumers have the willingness to pay but lack the financial means to complete the purchase.

The only thing that this study does is estimate how much appreciation the window shopper has for the dress or suit just inside the clothing store. This is unrealistic, further rendering the study’s trip value estimate useless.

Without resolution, this issue could halt finalization of the SDEIS.

Mobile River Bridge Plan is Fatally Flawed: Reason 12

I submitted an independent review of the Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Statement (SDEIS) to the Alabama Department of Transportation (ALDOT) on July 10, 2019. As of this writing, ALDOT has not acknowledged receipt of my report, containing 19 specific issues with the project's decision document. The SDEIS is the most important document pertaining to the project. The bridge and bayway replacement cannot go forward without it.

The document is fatally flawed.

Since ALDOT has neither publicly nor even privately acknowledged that they are aware of these 19 specific problems with their decision document, I am sharing them with you, one at a time.

Note: Comments 12-19 are all about the Traffic & Revenue Study, which is the key to how the toll structure was developed.  This is Economics 205 level stuff.

Comment 12: Value of time/willingness to pay is improperly estimated and therefore useless.

Basis: The Traffic and Revenue Study uses a contingent valuation method (CVM) to attempt to reveal consumers’ willingness to pay to avoid congestion.  CVM studies are notoriously difficult to conduct objectively and reliably and are most often used for small-scale projects or for preliminary investigations to determine whether additional investigations are warranted.

One difficulty in conducting a CVM study is attaining a representative sample of the population the analyst intends to model. This study contains no documentation of how the sample size or sample demographics were determined. This study provides no descriptive statistics and does not provide a margin of error for the topline figures or breakdowns by demographic. Accordingly, the reader cannot tell whether the survey’s sample is representative of the population being modeled. One could suspect that the sample was selected because it was most beneficial to the analyst’s desired outcome. Such appearances must be carefully avoided.

Assuming one has a representative sample, it must be surveyed with an unbiased survey instrument that does not lead respondents in any direction (i.e., leading towards favoring or opposing a particular project or alternative). There are numerous sets of examples and guides on designing an unbiased survey instrument, including a comprehensive collection of example questions recommended by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget for use in federal projects that may come before OMB for consideration for inclusion in the President’s budget. This study does not provide copies of the survey instrument, so the public cannot determine whether its questions are biased or unbiased.

Care must be taken in survey administration to screen for strategic bidding in survey responses. Generally (but not always), strategic bidding falls into two categories: the ‘free rider” response and the “altruist” response. The free rider pretends not to value the resource or good/service in the hopes that he/she will get the benefit for free and will place zero or mere token value on it. The altruist values societal benefit more than his own satisfaction and pretends to place greater value on the resource, giving it an inflated value. It is not acceptable to simply assume that the two strategies cancel each other. There is no indication that the T&R Study recognizes the problem of strategic bidding and does not provide assurance that it has been addressed.

There is no evidence that the sample is representative, that the survey is unbiased, or that strategic bidding has been accounted for and addressed.

A travel cost method using actual and forecast travel rates along with published statistics on vehicle operating costs would transparently estimate the actual value of a trip on the existing Bayway and its alternatives. However, no method other than a CVM was contemplated for this study.

Without resolution, this issue could halt finalization of the SDEIS.

Read the full report here.

Mobile River Bridge Plan is Fatally Flawed: Reason 11

I submitted an independent review of the Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Statement (SDEIS) to the Alabama Department of Transportation (ALDOT) on July 10, 2019. As of this writing, ALDOT has not acknowledged receipt of my report, containing 19 specific issues with the project's decision document. The SDEIS is the most important document pertaining to the project. The bridge and bayway replacement cannot go forward without it.

The document is fatally flawed.

Since ALDOT has neither publicly nor even privately acknowledged that they are aware of these 19 specific problems with their decision document, I am sharing them with you, one at a time.

Comment 11: Pedestrian/bicycle facilities do not meet any stated need or purpose in Section 2.0 of the SDEIS. They add significantly to the costs with no discussion of economic benefits or of how these facilities pay for themselves.

Basis: Nowhere in the SDEIS is there a discussion of recreational feature costs or any apparent means with which to offset them through tolls for recreational use. Nor is there any discussion of what economic or financial output is produced by these features, The SDEIS merely states that it is committed to providing them but does not state why they are needed.

Without resolution, this issue is unlikely to halt finalization of the SDEIS.

Read the full report here.

Mobile River Bridge Plan is Fatally Flawed: Reason 10

I submitted an independent review of the Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Statement (SDEIS) to the Alabama Department of Transportation (ALDOT) on July 10, 2019. As of this writing, ALDOT has not acknowledged receipt of my report, containing 19 specific issues with the project's decision document. The SDEIS is the most important document pertaining to the project. The bridge and bayway replacement cannot go forward without it.

The document is fatally flawed.

Since ALDOT has neither publicly nor even privately acknowledged that they are aware of these 19 specific problems with their decision document, I am sharing them with you, one at a time.

Comment 10: Allowing trucks to use the only tollfree route will increase risk to drivers unwilling or unable to pay tolls.

Basis: Risk is likely to increase by increasing traffic on the only tollfree route and exposing more noncommercial drivers to increased collision risk with large commercial, industrial and potentially hazardous materials transportation.

This has implications for ALDOT’s recent actions to close the Bankhead Tunnel on some weekends to allow for recreational use of the route. With traffic certain to increase on a tollfree route, the recreational use of Bankhead will almost certainly have to end.

Furthermore, this issue has environmental justice implications. Those with the least ability to pay are the populations that will have the greatest increase in risk.

Without resolution, this issue could halt finalization of the SDEIS.

Read the full report here.

Mobile River Bridge Plan is Fatally Flawed: Reason 9

I submitted an independent review of the Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Statement (SDEIS) to the Alabama Department of Transportation (ALDOT) on July 10, 2019. As of this writing, ALDOT has not acknowledged receipt of my report, containing 19 specific issues with the project's decision document. The SDEIS is the most important document pertaining to the project. The bridge and bayway replacement cannot go forward without it.

The document is fatally flawed.

Since ALDOT has neither publicly nor even privately acknowledged that they are aware of these 19 specific problems with their decision document, I am sharing them with you, one at a time.

Comment 9: The SDEIS references an unpublished ALDOT toll policy and the public cannot review it for reasonableness, fairness or legality.

Basis: The referenced policy has not been published. Or, if it has been published the public was never informed about its existence or given the ability to review it. 

ALDOT’s authority to establish policies generating income for the state or its contractors is likely to be challenged, as there is a belief only the state legislature may raise revenues.

Without resolution, this issue is unlikely to halt finalization of the SDEIS.

Read the full report here.

Mobile River Bridge Plan is Fatally Flawed: Reason 8

I submitted an independent review of the Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Statement (SDEIS) to the Alabama Department of Transportation (ALDOT) on July 10, 2019. As of this writing, ALDOT has not acknowledged receipt of my report, containing 19 specific issues with the project's decision document. The SDEIS is the most important document pertaining to the project. The bridge and bayway replacement cannot go forward without it.

The document is fatally flawed.

Since ALDOT has neither publicly nor even privately acknowledged that they are aware of these 19 specific problems with their decision document, I am sharing them with you, one at a time.

Comment 8: The SDEIS incorrectly states that availability of funding affects project viability.

Basis: Section 3.7.2 states: ”[b]ecause of the funding challenges ALDOT and the Federal government are currently experiencing, the project is only viable if the corridor is tolled.” This is incorrect. Funding availability has no bearing on economic or financial feasibility. Under NEPA, any economically and/or environmentally feasible alternative is considered viable. The project is either viable regardless of how it’s funded, or it’s not.

Furthermore, there is no evaluation showing that all reasonable non-tolled alternatives are economically infeasible and thus provide no net economic benefit over the no action alternative. The SDEIS does not evaluate tollfree alternatives at all.

Without resolution, this issue could halt finalization of the SDEIS.

Read the full report here.

Mobile River Bridge Plan is Fatally Flawed: Reason 7

I submitted an independent review of the Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Statement (SDEIS) to the Alabama Department of Transportation (ALDOT) on July 10, 2019. As of this writing, ALDOT has not acknowledged receipt of my report, containing 19 specific issues with the project's decision document. The SDEIS is the most important document pertaining to the project. The bridge and bayway replacement cannot go forward without it.

The document is fatally flawed.

Since ALDOT has neither publicly nor even privately acknowledged that they are aware of these 19 specific problems with their decision document, I am sharing them with you, one at a time.

Comment 7: The project schedule is vague and likely unrealistic, with no transparency in how the construction period was developed. There is no planning level schedule or construction plan, and there is no discussion of uncertainty or risks associated with the schedule.

This is a very large marine construction project. Projects of this scale and cost are uncommon. They require the obligation and use of large, specialized pieces of capital equipment and very highly specialized labor for management, supervision and actual construction. These capital and labor resources are often in use to full capacity during peak seasons and have their availability schedules known anywhere from 1-3 years in advance.

Schedule uncertainty can lead to expectations of significant delays in completion, causing unknown impacts and imposing unknown costs to owners, builders and operators.

A project that is over budget is usually off schedule and a project behind schedule is usually over budget. Since it was first examined in the 1990’s, this project has already seen its cost estimate more than double and was anticipated to have already been completed and in full operation by 2020. ALDOT has heroically completed many projects on schedule despite unforeseen setbacks, but the scale of this project will sorely test any plan. The SDEIS is incomplete without a detailed schedule discussion.

Without resolution, this issue could halt finalization of the SDEIS.

Mobile River Bridge Plan is Fatally Flawed: Reason 6

I submitted an independent review of the Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Statement (SDEIS) to the Alabama Department of Transportation (ALDOT) on July 10, 2019. As of this writing, ALDOT has not acknowledged receipt of my report, containing 19 specific issues with the project's decision document. The SDEIS is the most important document pertaining to the project. The bridge and bayway replacement cannot go forward without it.

The document is fatally flawed.

Since ALDOT has neither publicly nor even privately acknowledged that they are aware of these 19 specific problems with their decision document, I am sharing them with you, one at a time.

Comment 6: The SDEIS contains only top-level construction cost estimates and the costs disclosed lack enough detail to be evaluated for reasonableness and realism.

Basis: Project costs have more than doubled since publication of the 2014 EIS, from $773 million to $2.1 billion, a highly significant escalation. While the shift away from Bayway modification to Bayway replacement can account for some of this increase, the public must be provided with a transparent accounting of costs. Section 4.4.4 is the only section of the SDEIS that discusses project costs and it does so in only the broadest and briefest terms.

There is no cost appendix to the SDEIS. There is no breakdown of project cost by feature, year, task, etc. This is an unacceptable lack of full disclosure under any reasonable interpretation of NEPA. The public has had no opportunity to examine the detailed cost estimate of the recommended plan or any of its alternatives.

Public disclosure and review of project costs is necessary under NEPA guidance.

Without resolution, this issue could halt finalization of the SDEIS.

Read the full report here.

Mobile River Bridge Plan is Fatally Flawed: Reason 5

I submitted an independent review of the Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Statement (SDEIS) to the Alabama Department of Transportation (ALDOT) on July 10, 2019. As of this writing, ALDOT has not acknowledged receipt of my report, containing 19 specific issues with the project's decision document. The SDEIS is the most important document pertaining to the project. The bridge and bayway replacement cannot go forward without it.

The document is fatally flawed.

Since ALDOT has neither publicly nor even privately acknowledged that they are aware of these 19 specific problems with their decision document, I am sharing them with you, one at a time.

Comment 5: The evaluation of potential storm surge risk to the existing Bayway in Appendix G is incomplete without a consequence analysis, and storm surge risk is a key factor in the decision to examine only replacement alternatives for the Bayway.

Basis: Rather than focusing only on Bayway replacement, additional alternatives that include armoring and retrofit of an existing and storm-tested structure are required.

The mere existence of probability that a tropical storm or hurricane could affect the existing Bayway is insufficient justification for forgoing evaluation of alternatives that add capacity to the structure. While the coastal engineering analyses in Appendix G show that there is a chance that the Bayway will be overtopped or inundated, there is no discussion of the consequences of inundating events. Merely stating that the existing Bayway is vulnerable to storm urge is not enough to demand its replacement.

Even a storm with the intensity and surge of Hurricane Katrina could leave the unmodified but well-maintained structure intact or cause a damage level that is acceptable given such storms’ very low frequency of occurrence. Damage consequences must be considered in tandem with damage frequency. We cannot design or build away 100% of risk. The SDEIS fails to address the tandem relationship between storm event probability and consequence, and risk cannot be communicated without it.

This risk analysis cannot be done reliably in a qualitative manner. Explicit return frequencies of potentially damaging storms must be disclosed. The potential damages to the affected structures must be estimated, and the full life-cycle cost of the storm damage risk must be shown. Since 100% of risk avoidance is unattainable, some measurable level of risk must be identified as acceptable and it must be made explicit. If the SDEIS states that a structure must be designed to withstand the 100-year event, it must explain why that level of protection is necessary.

Residual risk must also be communicated under current NEPA guidance. The SDEIS does not state the risk that will remain in the as-built condition. There is no discussion of expected project performance. Given the uncertainties associated with a 100-year event, a 100-year storm would still have a probability of causing damage and disruptive effects. These are not acknowledged or discussed. The project performance in the 250- and 500-year events’ risk are not discussed.

Appendix G is thus incomplete and represents only one half of the risk analysis.

Without resolution, this issue should halt finalization of the SDEIS.

Mobile River Bridge Plan is Fatally Flawed: Reason 4

I submitted an independent review of the Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Statement (SDEIS) to the Alabama Department of Transportation (ALDOT) on July 10, 2019. As of this writing, ALDOT has not acknowledged receipt of my report, containing 19 specific issues with the project's decision document. The SDEIS is the most important document pertaining to the project. The bridge and bayway replacement cannot go forward without it.

The document is fatally flawed.

Since ALDOT has neither publicly nor even privately acknowledged that they are aware of these 19 specific problems with their decision document, I am sharing them with you, one at a time.

Comment 4: The alternative formulation and screening process required by NEPA is virtually nonexistent in the SDEIS, and a range of potentially feasible alternatives were not considered.

Basis: General practice in public infrastructure project planning calls for development of a very broad array of alternative plans and then to screen alternatives that don’t meet planning objectives, violate planning constraints or present technical or environmental hurdles too great to overcome. The SDEIS references a screening process conducting in the 2014 EIS.

However, the SDEIS explains that new geotechnical, hydrologic and engineering issues have been identified for the no-build alternative and each of the 2014 EIS’ build alternatives. The iterative process of alternative plan formulation calls for using this new information to restart the screening process to see if the new data affects carry-forward potential of the old alternatives. This was not done. The SDEIS simply scraps the alternatives evaluated in the 2014 EIS.

None of the build alternatives in the 2014 EIS included design/construction of toll systems. None of them called for full-scale replacement of the existing Bayway. All of the build alternatives in the SDEIS call for tolling systems and all call for complete replacement of the existing Bayway.

There is no comparison of modified 2014 EIS alternatives to new alternatives developed in light of the new data.

Alternatives not considered or discussed in the SDEIS include such measures as armoring or retrofit of existing Bayway spans during new construction and build alternatives not requiring any modifications for tolling.

This Comment and Comment 1 are related, but they are not the same. Comment 1 relates to the purpose of an SDEIS and what is expected in reformulation. This comment relates to the conduct of an EIS as if the formulation was started anew.

Without resolution, this issue could halt finalization of the SDEIS.

Read the full report here.

Mobile River Bridge Plan is Fatally Flawed: Reason 3

I submitted an independent review of the Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Statement (SDEIS) to the Alabama Department of Transportation (ALDOT) on July 10, 2019. As of this writing, ALDOT has not acknowledged receipt of my report, containing 19 specific issues with the project's decision document. The SDEIS is the most important document pertaining to the project. The bridge and bayway replacement cannot go forward without it.

The document is fatally flawed.

Since ALDOT has neither publicly nor even privately acknowledged that they are aware of these 19 specific problems with their decision document, I am sharing them with you, one at a time.
Comment 3: Cumulative impacts to the local or national economy have not been sufficiently addressed. This is a NEPA requirement that has not been met.

Basis: The 2014 EIS is appended by a Martin Associates study that attempts to describe an estimation of economic impacts associated with the various bridge alternatives. None of these alternatives evaluated or included complete replacement of the Bayway, since there were no Bayway replacements given serious consideration in the 2014 EIS.

Additionally, the Martin study only addresses negative impacts and does not estimate potential economic benefits of the project, doesn’t explore project costs and doesn’t mention risk and uncertainty.

The Martin Study also fails to address potential impacts to Mobile-Baldwin County economic interdependence. These two counties are unique in Alabama in that they share proximity to Mobile Bay and the five rivers delta exclusively. The bay and the delta are a primary resource for the economic output and competitiveness of the two counties.

The economic livelihood of Mobile County is closely tied to that of Baldwin County, and vice versa. There are many people who live in Baldwin and commute to Mobile for work. The reverse is true as well. Imposing a toll on Mobile and Baldwin County commuters will have a significant impact on the productivity of both county economies. A toll (or a tax) on Mobile County drivers is a toll (or a tax) on Baldwin County economic output and vice versa. The SDEIS does not address this issue.

Further, the Martin study describes only local impacts and is limited to an unreasonably small number of sectors in the economy. The Martin study does not address impacts to the national economy at all and fails to address impacts to commercial navigation though to Mobile Harbor Ship Channel and Turning Basin. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers recently completed a study on the feasibility of deepening this project. Yet the SDEIS is silent on how the two projects may interact during construction and/or during maintenance operations of either or both.

The 1997 and 2012 economic evaluations are both too old, too superficial and too incomplete to determine what net economic benefit accrues to the proposed project. The communication of both detrimental and beneficial economic impacts is crucial to gaining local, state, regional and national acceptance of such a large, complex and expensive project.

Without resolution, this issue could halt finalization of the SDEIS.

Mobile River Bridge Plan is Fatally Flawed: Reason 2

I submitted an independent review of the Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Statement (SDEIS) to the Alabama Department of Transportation (ALDOT) on July 10, 2019. As of this writing, ALDOT has not acknowledged receipt of my report, containing 19 specific issues with the project's decision document. The SDEIS is the most important document pertaining to the project. The bridge and bayway replacement cannot go forward without it.

The document is fatally flawed.

Since ALDOT has neither publicly nor even privately acknowledged that they are aware of these 19 specific problems with their decision document, I am sharing them with you, one at a time.

Comment 2: There is no economic analysis demonstrating that the proposed project produces an economic OR financial benefit that is equal to or greater than the project costs.

Basis: Economic feasibility drives almost all government participation in public infrastructure projects. Transportation, flood/storm risk reduction, navigation, recreation and even many environmental restoration/enhancement projects are expected to produce a measurable output that has a value making it worth the expected cost. In projects with outputs that can be valued monetarily, a benefit cost ratio (BCR) is computed. A project is considered feasible if its BCR is greater than 1.0 to 1.0.

The only feasibility evaluation that attempted to determine a BCR for a new bridge system was conducted in 1997, for which there is only an Executive Summary available for public review. That feasibility study represents at best a reconnaissance level of detail and cannot be used to justify the project proposed by the SDEIS.

The 2014 EIS includes no evaluations of economic feasibility.

This means that there are no recent analyses of project benefits vs project costs available. Neither the public nor decision makers at the local, state or federal levels can understand why this project makes good economic or financial sense. We have no means to measure this project’s worth vis-à-vis the myriad of other competing uses of scarce public resources.

Without resolution, this issue should halt finalization of the SDEIS.

You can read my full report here.